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Abstract
This study analyzes the political economy of Japanese monetary and exchange rate policy, 
with particular emphasis on the Japanese position regarding East Asian monetary cooperation 
and integration. We try to disentangle the factors and interest structures behind the polices taken 
in order to infer how the Japanese position regarding regional monetary cooperation might 
evolve over time. The analysis shows that while the current incentive structure within the Japa-
nese economic and political system gives little room for a far reaching commitment of the Japa-
nese government to engage in regional monetary cooperation, a further integration of the Japa-
nese economy into the regional economy and a growing dependency on the East Asian market 
are likely to shift the equilibrium in favor of regional cooperation.
1. Introduction
Japanese economic policy—including monetary and exchange rate policy—
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has traditionally been unconcerned about regional economic cooperation. With 
Japan being a relatively closed economy and otherwise being oriented in its 
exports mostly to global rather than regional markets, monetary policy was 
primarily focused on domestic economic developments; monetary and ex-
change rate cooperation with the regional neighbors was not an issue at all. Yet 
things have changed since the East Asian crisis of 1997–98. At the G7-IMF 
meetings in Hong Kong in September 1997, just weeks after the outbreak of the 
crisis in Thailand on July 2, the Japanese fi nancial authorities proposed the 
creation of an Asian Monetary Fund (AMF) as a framework for fi nancial coop-
eration and policy coordination in the region. While the plan for an AMF was 
withdrawn shortly after its proposal because of pressure from Washington 
(which will be discussed in more detail later on) it marked a notable change in 
the Japanese policy toward its neighbors.
The crisis highlighted the close economic dependencies within the region 
and stirred great interest in regional fi nancial and monetary cooperation in Ja-
pan as well as the rest of East Asia. The crisis was followed by a continuous 
policy dialogue and a string of cooperative initiatives in the area of money and 
fi nance between Japan, China, South Korea, and the ten member countries of 
the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)—a grouping that has 
become known as ASEAN+3. While some progress has been made in East Asia 
post crisis in the area of fi nancial cooperation, monetary and exchange rate co-
operation has not materialized yet. This might be somewhat surprising given 
the high degree of intraregional trade that ASEAN+3 countries have already 
achieved. With intraregional trade on average accounting for almost 60 percent 
of total trade for ASEAN+3 countries, the region is almost reaching levels of 
real economic integration seen in the European Union (EU). Especially for 
Japanese corporations, who have invested heavily in the region and established 
extensive trade-FDI-networks throughout Southeast and Northeast Asia, in-
traregional exchange rate stability should be paramount. One thus might expect 
Japanese businesses, and hence the Japanese government, to take an active in-
terest in regional monetary and exchange rate cooperation.
So far, the Japanese authorities’ posture regarding regional monetary coop-
eration has been ambivalent. On the one hand, Japan has so far maintained a 
distinct position with respect to exchange rate policy in East Asia. While virtu-
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ally all other East Asian countries have followed relatively similar exchange 
rate policies, with their currencies all being effectively linked to the US dollar 
in the form of soft or hard pegs, Japan has been the only country in the region 
that did not stabilize its exchange rate against the dollar, except for short peri-
ods of intervention (e.g., Spiegel 2003). Thus, while the other East Asian coun-
tries have formed what has become known as the informal “East Asian dollar 
standard” (McKinnon 2001), a system that has provided relative exchange rate 
stability between these countries, Japan has followed its own singular exchange 
rate policy, making the exchange rates of Japan vis-à-vis its neighbors vulner-
able to swings in the yen-dollar exchange rate.
On the other hand, Japan has launched important initiatives directed toward 
regional monetary cooperation in East Asia, such as the above mentioned AMF 
proposal, and played a key role in developing the Chiang Mai Initiative, a net-
work of bilateral swap arrangements among ASEAN+3 countries that provides 
for mutual assistance in the event of a fi nancial crisis. Also, Japan has been a 
driving force in other initiatives launched by the ASEAN+3 fi nance ministers, 
such as the ASEAN+3 surveillance process and the ASEAN+3 Economic Re-
view and Policy Dialogue. Moreover, the idea of an Asian Currency Unit, now 
promoted by the ADB, originated in Japan. (The current president of the ADB, 
Haruhiko Kuroda, who is an ardent supporter of the ACU, is a former high-
level Japanese government offi cial.)
The aim of this paper is to understand the political economy of monetary and 
exchange rate policy in Japan in the context of the regional economy. That is, 
we try to disentangle the factors and interest structures behind the polices taken 
in order to infer how the Japanese position regarding regional monetary coop-
eration might evolve. The position and policy actions of Japan as the largest 
economy in East Asia and a major actor in regional trade and investment will 
have great impact on the future course of East Asian monetary cooperation. A 
better comprehension of the Japanese position with respect to East Asian mon-
etary cooperation is therefore crucial to understanding the perspectives for re-
gional monetary cooperation and integration.
We defi ne international monetary cooperation quite broadly to include, for 
instance, consultations between policymakers regarding the choice of monetary 
and exchange rate regimes and the exchange of information among monetary 
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authorities. With monetary coordination we refer to the agreement by two or 
more countries to a cooperative set of policy changes, which none of the coun-
tries involved would take on their own. Lastly, by monetary integration we 
mean all forms of coordinated currency stabilization. Besides monetary union, 
which is defi ned as an area where a common currency circulates which is issued 
by a single central bank, monetary integration comprises also less far reaching 
forms such as coordinated pegging to the same anchor currency or currency 
basket, and the establishment of a common exchange rate system.
Parts of the information in this paper is based on informal interviews that 
were conducted with researchers, policymakers, and offi cials of the Japanese 
authorities and Japanese business organizations; with representatives of inter-
national fi nancial institutions, foreign embassies, governments, and central 
banks; with journalists; and with Japanese and international academic scholars 
familiar with the Japanese and regional situation. The interpretation of the in-
formation gathered in these interviews is ours alone and should in no way mean 
to refl ect the offi cial point of view of any of the organizations or governments 
concerned.
The paper is structured as follows. The next section gives an overview of the 
theoretical literature on the political economy of monetary and exchange rate 
policy so as to provide the theoretical background for the analysis that is to fol-
low thereafter. Section 3 describes the institutional setting of Japanese monetary 
and exchange rate policy and the roles of the main actors, most importantly the 
Bank of Japan (BOJ) and the Ministry of Finance (MOF). Section 4 then turns 
to Japan’s role in East Asian monetary cooperation and integration and scruti-
nizes the roles of relevant stakeholders and their interests and policies. Section 
5 concludes with some predictions of how the Japanese policies with respect to 
regional integration might develop.
2. Theoretical literature review
There is a rich theoretical literature looking at the political economy of mon-
etary and exchange rate policy. We fi rst review the more general literature look-
ing at how monetary and exchange rate policy might be shaped by the interests 
of a ruling government and the political business cycle. We then turn to the 
political economy of monetary integration.
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The political business cycle, the time inconsistency problem, and central 
bank independence
The departure point of the political economy literature is that economic pol-
icy decisions are not simply based on the considerations of a benign dictator 
who takes into account all relevant information and then maximizes the econo-
my’s utility function as economic theory in its most simple form assumes. In 
reality, policy decisions are infl uenced by the interests of the stakeholders in-
volved. This includes the personal or institutional interests of the policymakers 
themselves, as well as those of interest groups that will be affected by the out-
come of policy decisions, and who might therefore seek to infl uence the con-
tents of the policies by lobbying the government.
Nordhaus (1975) has developed the model of a political business cycle where 
the government in a democratic society has an incentive to infl uence economic 
behavior in a way that will produce a benign economic environment just before 
upcoming elections and that will thus favor the government’s re-election. One 
of the assumptions of this model is that there exists a non-vertical Phillips curve 
in which shifts in aggregate demand generate changes in output and employ-
ment, at least temporarily. Moreover, politicians are assumed to be able to in-
strument fi scal or monetary policy to exploit this situation in order to remain in 
power. This basic political business cycle model has been extended to include 
partisan considerations (Hibbs 1977), endogenous election cycles (Chappell 
and Peel 1979, Lachler 1982), and rational expectations of voters (Alesina 
1987).
Kydland and Prescott (1977) and Barro and Gordon (1983) have formalized 
the time inconsistency problem that arises from a situation where the govern-
ment (or the central bank) can change its monetary policy stance after fi rms and 
workers have concluded nominal wage and price contracts. By an unanticipated 
monetary expansion—which would bring about surprise infl ation—the central 
bank can create a temporary output expansion. If the central bank misuses its 
policy repeatedly, agents will take this into consideration and expect a higher 
infl ation rate, hence settling for higher wage and price contracts, which in turn 
will increase actual infl ation. Discretionary central bank policy is thus likely to 
lead to an infl ation bias. Central bank independence is generally viewed as a 
means to outrule such behavior and solve the dynamic-inconsistency problem. 
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The institutional independence of the central bank is thus an important determi-
nant of whether monetary policy can be instrumented by policymakers to infl u-
ence the political business cycle in order to secure their re-election.
The political economy of monetary integration
Henning (1994) maintains that private-sector preferences and government 
institutions jointly determine the disposition of countries toward international 
monetary matters. The literature on the political economy of monetary integra-
tion highlights the distributional effects of coordination or non-coordination of 
monetary policies and exchange rates on different groups within an economy 
(see, e.g., Broz and Frieden 2006; Hefeker 1997). Groups involved in foreign 
trade and investment are generally predicted to have an interest in exchange rate 
stability as this is commonly assumed to promote trade and investment. Hence, 
internationally oriented corporations that import or export a lot and that are 
heavily exposed to exchange rate risk are expected to prefer stable exchange 
rates. Groups whose economic activities are more focused on the domestic 
economy, in contrast, are assumed to prefer a fl oating regime that will allow the 
government to use economic policies to stabilize the domestic economy. The 
latter group typically includes producers of non-tradable goods and fi rms from 
the import-competing sector.
Similarly, banks and other fi nancial institutions without substantial interna-
tional business or foreign asset portfolio will be usually most concerned about 
domestic infl ation, as rising infl ation typically reduces the positive spread be-
tween the cost of funds and the return on assets, threatening to lower their 
profi tability. They will thus have a preference for the central bank having a 
strong focus on infl ation, i.e., exchange rate policy will not be a primary con-
cern for them (Henning 1994, chapter 2). Banks engaged in international busi-
ness will typically fi nd it easier than manufacturers to cope with volatile ex-
change rates, although banks with heavy long-term commitment in foreign 
fi xed assets, e.g., foreign subsidiaries, might as well be adversely affected by 
exchange rate volatility.
In his sunk cost model Krugman (1989, pp. 44–59) has shown how exchange 
rate variability is likely to infl uence exporting fi rms’ international pricing of 
goods, as well as their international investment behavior.1) Firms usually price 
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their goods or services in the currency of the country they sell them in. Due to 
competition in the foreign market, they are not able to adjust these prices to 
exchange rate changes, with the result that the exporting fi rm has to bear the 
costs of an appreciation of its home currency, and might even accumulate 
losses. Krugman’s (1989) “sunk cost” refers to the investment costs that occur 
when entering and exiting a foreign market, such as costs for market research 
or the development of a sales network. The larger exchange rate uncertainty, the 
higher the risk of a failed investment. This causes potential investors to adopt a 
wait-and-see attitude toward foreign investment, and, due to exchange rate un-
certainty, exporters will only undertake investments that can be expected to 
reap a higher rate on investment than those in the domestic market. As a conse-
quence, fi rms are likely to invest less, which implies opportunity costs and by-
gone profi ts. For those engaged in cross-border and foreign currency transac-
tions, predictable or completely fi xed exchange rates are therefore of high 
value, and hence interest groups which prefer fi xed over fl exible rates can be 
found especially in sectors exposed to international trade.
A further incentive for entering a monetary arrangement such as a regional 
monetary system relates to the time inconsistency problem described above. 
Monetary integration can be used to instrument economic reform and buy cred-
ibility to overcome the time inconsistency problem. The time inconsistency 
literature was able to show that monetary credibility of a country with high in-
fl ation rises through the entry into a currency area because policy makers get 
their “hands tied” (Giavazzi and Pagano 1988). The strategy of tying one’s 
hands aims at the import of stability, because an exchange rate target requires 
the subordination of national economic policies and currency devaluations can-
not be used to compensate for infl ationary price and wage policies. The as-
sumption is that national governments would not be able to see through such a 
policy course on their own. Recent contributions have particularly discussed 
how a stabilization of exchange rates can induce changes in the labor and factor 
markets or changes in the monetary policy regime that suppress infl ationary 
 1) See also Collignon (1999).
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wage and price setting and that bring about a convergence of infl ation rates.2)
3. The Japanese institutional setting and policy record to date
To understand the political economy of Japanese monetary and exchange rate 
policy, it is important to be aware of the institutional setting in which policy is 
being conducted. The two most important actors are the BOJ and the MOF.
The BOJ is responsible for conducting Japanese monetary policy, as speci-
fi ed in the BOJ law, whereas the MOF is in charge of exchange rate policy. The 
BOJ law was rewritten in 1997 and came into effect in April 1998. Under the 
old law, which was written during World War II, the BOJ had little de jure inde-
pendence.3) The new law signifi cantly strengthened the BOJ’s institutional and 
policy independence.
Article 1 of the new BOJ law (BOJ 1997) defi nes “[t]he objective of the Bank 
of Japan, as the central bank of Japan, […] to issue banknotes and to carry out 
currency and monetary control. In addition […], the Bank’s objective is to en-
sure smooth settlement of funds among banks and other fi nancial institutions, 
thereby contributing to the maintenance of an orderly fi nancial system.” Article 
2 of the BOJ law stipulates as the principal objective of currency and monetary 
control that “[c]urrency and monetary control shall be aimed at, through the 
pursuit of price stability, contributing to the sound development of the national 
economy.”
Monetary policy decisions are made by majority vote at the BOJ’s Monetary 
Policy Meetings (MPM) of the Policy Board. The board consists of nine mem-
bers: the governor, two deputy governors and six experts on monetary affairs 
and economics. The new BOJ law states that members of the Policy Board are 
appointed on the basis of their expertise.
 2) Schelkle (2001a) maintains that especially structural infl ation might only be overcome by a 
policy of monetary integration. This might have been a main reason for Italy’s membership in 
the EMS, even though it meant a complete departure from past economic policies (Giavazzi and 
Pagano 1988). The convergence of interest rates was also one of the Maastricht criteria, and the 
convergence that was achieved illustrates the structural change in national economic policies 
that was made possible by the political decision to join EMU. For a comprehensive treatment of 
the interaction between wage bargaining and monetary policy in the European Monetary and 
Economic Union see Dullien (2004).
 3)  For a detailed account of the Japanese monetary policy up to the mid 1990s, i.e., the time 
before the BOJ law was rewritten, see Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (1997).
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The BOJ’s institutional independence and the transparency of monetary 
policy decisions were greatly enhanced under the new BOJ law. The process of 
drafting the new BOJ law, however, was rather coincidental. The amendment 
came about as a political compromise in the aftermath of the burst of the asset 
bubble in late 1990s, when the reputation of the MOF as a supervising author-
ity over the fi nancial sector had been shattered—more so than the reputation of 
the BOJ which is often blamed for leaving the bubble growing too long. The 
trigger for BOJ reform came from outside politically as part of the MOF reform 
after the jusen (housing loan fi nance companies) crisis in 1996. According to 
Shigeru Ito, the then Vice President of the Social Democratic Party (one of the 
ruling coalition parties at the time) and head of the MOF reform project team, 
the reform plan for abolishing the MOF’s Banking and Securities Bureau and 
the decoupling of treasurer and fi nancial supervision functions caused immense 
resistance from the MOF (cf. Tokyo Shinbun 2007). To shift attention away 
from the MOF reform, it was decided to amend the BOJ law. Although the 
MOF wanted to keep the BOJ under its control it compromised in order to keep 
itself out of the fi re. In July 1996 then Prime Minister Ryutaro Hashimoto ap-
pointed Yasuhiko Torii, then president of Keio University, to head an advisory 
Central Bank Study Group.
The MOF opposed to the Study Group’s original draft which did not include 
government representatives in the BOJ’s Policy Board and succeeded in allow-
ing two non-voting government representatives “when necessary, [to] attend 
and express views at Board meetings for monetary control matters” (Article 
19.1) as well as the right to “submit proposals regarding monetary control mat-
ters, or request that the Board postpone a vote on monetary control matters until 
the next board meeting of this type.” (Article 19.2) Moreover, Article 4 of the 
new law stipulates that the BOJ “shall always maintain close contact with the 
government and exchange views suffi ciently, so that its currency and monetary 
control and the basic stance of the government’s economic policy shall be mu-
tually harmonious.”
Nevertheless, the new BOJ law meant a great advancement in terms of inde-
pendence when compared with the previous law.4) In the assessment of Ito 
 4)  Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (2000, chapter 4) provide a detailed comparison of the changes to 
the BOJ law.
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(2006, pp. 106–7), “[t]he Bank of Japan Law of 1998 is in every sense a state-
of-the-art modern central banking law. The central bank is given a mandate of 
price stability (Article 2), and there is no mention of aggregate demand or full 
employment as part of its objective. Institutional independence is guaranteed in 
the sense that Governors as well as Policy Board members will not be dismissed 
unless physically or mentally incapacitated; their terms of appointment are fi ve 
years; government offi cials attend Board meetings only as non-voting mem-
bers.”5)
Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (2000) use the rating method developed by Cuki-
erman, Webb and Neyapti (1993) as the most detailed and recent among avail-
able methods for rating the degree of independence of the BOJ on a de jure 
basis. Table 1 compares the rating of the BOJ during 1980–89 as evaluated by 
Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti (CWN) and that of the BOJ under the new law, 
evaluated by Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (CHI). As can be seen in Table 1, the 
score of independence rose substantially with the new BoJ law from 0.18 to 
0.39.6) The new rating now compares favorably with those of other advanced 
economies, placing the BOJ in the middle of a ranking of central bank indepen-
dence of advanced countries, compared to 20th out of a group of 21 advanced 
countries before the reform (cf. Cargill, Hutchison and Ito 1997, p. 184).7)
An episode that illustrates the BOJ’s newly gained monetary policy indepen-
dence after the reform of the BOJ law is recounted by Ito (2006, p. 112):
 5)  Moreover, under the new law transparency of monetary policy decision-making was greatly 
enhanced. Under the old regime the monetary policy board was often described as rubber-
stamping decisions that were already made beforehand by the MOF and there was no disclosure 
of minutes or transcript. The BOJ under the new law, in contrast, announces its decisions on the 
day of meeting, followed by a press conference by the governor within a few days. Detailed 
minutes are publicly disclosed several weeks after the meeting (cf. Ito 2006).
 6)  Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (2000) point out that due to a wrong assessment in item 1c, CWN’s 
rating value of 0.83 under the old law is apparently a mistake because the governor was subject 
to dismissal under any conditions. Therefore the overall rating under the old law should have 
been 0.0415, lower than 0.18.
 7)  Cargill, Hutchison and Ito (2000, p. 111) emphasize that despite its low de jure independence 
the BOJ’s infl ation record was the lowest with an average infl ation rate of 3.31 percent for the 
period 1975–96 in a sample of 19 industrial countries. They argue that the Japanese tradition of 
a “long-lived” and highly autonomous government bureaucracy and the resulting strong institu-
tional standing of the MOF might have de-linked the MOF and thus also the BOJ from the po-
litical business cycle, helping the BOJ to achieve price stability.
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Table 1 Independence of BOJ before and after reform of the BOJ law
Japan’s score
Japan’s
weighted score
Item
Adjusted 
weight
(2)
CWN
(3)
CHI
(4)
CWN
(2)x(3)
CHI
(2)x(4)
1. Chief executive offi cer (CEO)
a. Term of offi ce 0.05 0.05 0.5 0.5 0.025 0.025
b. Appointment 0.05 0.05 0.25 0.75 0.0125 0.0375
c. Dismissal 0.05 0.05 0.83 0.83 0.0415 0.0415
d. Joint appointment in government offi ces 0.05 0.05 0.5 1.0 0.025 0.05
Subtotal 0.104 0.154
2. Policy formulation
a. Formulation of monetary policy 0.05 0.05 0.67 1.0 0.0335 0.05
b. Authority on resolution of confl ict 0.05 0.05 0 1.0 0 0.05
c. Role in government’s budget process 0.05 0.05 0 0 0 0
Subtotal
3. Objectives
a. Stated objectives do not include price sta-
bility
b. Price stability is one goal, with the others 
compatible
0.15 0.15 0 0.6 0 0.09
c. Objectives include stable banking system 0.0335 0.10
4. Limitations on lending to government
a. Advances for nonsecuritized lending 0.15 0.1765 0 0
b. Securitized lending 0.1 0.1765 0 0
c. Terms of lending 0.1 0.1765 0.33 0.33 0.033 0.033
d. Potential borrowers from bank 0.05 NA
e. Limits on central bank lending 0.025 NA
f. Maturity on loans 0.025 0.0294 0 0
g. Interest rates on loans 0.025 0.0294 0.25 0.25 0.006 0.066
h. Buying or selling government securities in 
the primary market
0.025 0.0294 0 0
Subtotal 0.039 0.039
Total = 1 + 2 + 3 + 4 0.18 0.39
Source: Cargill, Hutchison, Ito (2000), Table 4.3, pp. 108–9.
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“When Governor Hayami and some Board members started to suggest in the spring of 2000 
that ZIRP [the BOJ’s Zero Interest Rate Policy] might be terminated soon, many economists and 
government offi cials questioned the basis for early tightening. The economy was only on a frag-
ile recovery path, and the internal and external environment was turning worse, as the IT stock 
bubble had burst. The US economy was slowing down due to the collapse of IT stock prices. 
Domestic consumption and investment were also slowing down. However, the Bank of Japan 
pushed the agenda. It is said that the Bank wanted to raise the interest rate in the July MPM, but 
that this was pushed back by one month because it feared a negative impact of the failure of the 
Sogo Department Store. As the department store failure turned out to be not so negative for the 
overall economy, the motion was tabled in the MPM of August 2000. In the 11 August MP meet-
ing, the government offi cials who attended the meeting without voting power argued that it 
would be too early to raise the interest rate. The government offi cials […] submitted a motion to 
delay the voting on the interest rate hike by one month. This was the maximum resistance and 
show of displeasure that the government could make against the independent central bank. The 
delay motion was voted down by the votes of 1 in favour to 8 against. Then, the motion for an 
interest rate hike was passed by 7 in favour and 2 against.”
In summary, one can say that the BOJ maintains a fairly high degree of mon-
etary policy independence today, also compared with other central banks. Yet, 
the already mentioned division of labor between the BOJ and the MOF with 
respect to monetary policy and exchange rate policy leaves room for potential 
discord: the MOF’s responsibility for the external value of the yen stands in 
confl ict with the BOJ’s independent conduct of monetary policy.
The Foreign Exchange and Foreign Trade Law stipulates that the “Minister 
of Finance shall endeavor to stabilize the external value of the yen through 
foreign exchange trading and other measures” (Article 7.3). Moreover, “the 
Minister of Finance is legally authorized to conduct intervention as a means to 
achieve foreign exchange rate stability. The Bank of Japan, as the agent of the 
Minister of Finance, executes foreign exchange intervention operations in ac-
cordance with the directions of the Minister of Finance.”8) (BOJ 2000) The BOJ 
(2000) is thus keen to emphasize on its website that it “might therefore be mis-
leading” to speak of “Bank of Japan Intervention”, as is often done in the me-
dia.
 8)  The BOJ law stipulates that the BOJ buy and sell foreign exchange “as the agent of the gov-
ernment […], when its purpose is to stabilize the exchange rate of the national currency” (Arti-
cle 40, Section 2). The Foreign Exchange Fund Special Account Law stipulates that “the Minis-
ter of Finance may entrust operations involving the Foreign Exchange Fund that are stipulated 
in the Article 5 to the Bank of Japan (Article 6, Section 1).” (BOJ 2000)
15
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The practice that the BOJ has to administer foreign exchange interventions if 
asked to do so by the MOF has serious implications for its monetary policy. 
When offi cial intervention is non-sterilized, the purchase (or sale) of foreign 
currency is matched by an increase (or decrease) in net foreign assets and an 
equivalent increase (decrease) in the monetary base. Non-sterilized interven-
tion has therefore the same effect on the central bank’s monetary liabilities as 
an open market operation. If the BOJ is ordered by the MOF to intervene in the 
foreign exchange market, its monetary policy is hence directly affected. Theo-
retically, the BOJ will always be able to sterilize foreign exchange intervention 
to neutralize the effects on monetary supply. Sterilization usually involves sell-
ing or purchasing domestic bonds or currency bills to offset the effects of a 
change in offi cial foreign asset holdings on the domestic monetary base. There 
are, however, two problems with sterilization. First, sterilization is likely to 
weaken or even offset the intended effect on the exchange rate, which in the 
Japanese setting could cause discord between BOJ and MOF.9) Second, heavy 
and frequent intervention in the foreign exchange market inevitably constrains 
the central bank in adopting an effective monetary policy (e.g., Obstfeld 1982). 
Excessive purchase of foreign exchange will make it increasingly diffi cult for 
the central bank to mop up domestic liquidity, endangering price stability.
An example of this quandary was given in summer/autumn 1999. At the time 
the Japanese economy was in recovery after a long period of zero interest rate 
policy and expansionary fi scal policy under the Obuchi administration. As the 
government feared that the appreciating yen would choke off the recovery, the 
MOF instructed the BOJ to intervene in the foreign exchange market by selling 
yen and buying US dollar. In this situation the markets paid a close attention to 
whether the BOJ would respond by sterilizing (Yamada 2007). In its Monetary 
Policy Meeting on September 21, 1999, the BOJ made clear its “price stability 
fi rst” position by not only deciding to sterilize, but also announcing that
“[t]he foreign exchange rate in itself is not a direct objective of monetary 
policy. One of the precious lessons we learned from the experience of policy 
 9)  The effectiveness of offi cial intervention in the foreign exchange market is hotly contended 
among economists. See, e.g., Sarno and Taylor (2001), Fatum and Hutchison (2003), Domingues 
and Frankel (1993a, 1993b).
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operations during the bubble period is that, monetary policy operations linked 
with control of the foreign exchange rate runs a risk of leading to erroneous 
policy decisions. Having said this, it does not mean that monetary policy is 
pursued without any consideration to the development of the foreign exchange 
rate. The Bank considers it important to carefully monitor the development of 
the foreign exchange rate from the viewpoint of how it affects the economy and 
prices.” (BOJ 1999, §7)
With this announcement, the yen continued to appreciate, making the inter-
vention effectless.
Fatum and Hutchison (2005) investigate the effect of foreign exchange inter-
vention on the yen exchange rate and Japanese monetary policy for the period 
2003–04. They fi nd that intervention was somewhat effective in infl uencing the 
yen’s external value over short periods of time (several days), but less so over 
longer periods. They associate the limited effectiveness of intervention with a 
high degree of sterilization and suggest that “from a technical perspective the 
BOJ has not allowed MOF intervention decisions to infl uence the day-to-day 
conduct of monetary policy” (Fatum and Hutchison 2005, p. 259), again under-
lining the BOJ’s claim for institutional and policy independence.
4. Japan and East Asian regional monetary cooperation
4.1 Regional monetary and fi nancial cooperation initiatives since the 
Asian crisis
Already during the Asian crisis, attempts were made to establish a regional 
scheme for fi nancial cooperation. In August 1997, only weeks after the out-
break of the crisis in Thailand, the Japanese government proposed the creation 
of an AMF as a framework for fi nancial cooperation and policy coordination in 
the region. The AMF, which was to be endowed with USD 100 billion of central 
bank reserves, was intended as a lender to countries in fi nancial distress and a 
complementary means of defense against fi nancial crises in Asia. Kwan (2001, 
p. 35) describes the endeavor to build an AMF “as an attempt by Asian coun-
tries to escape domination by Washington and to achieve fi nancial indepen-
dence.” It is therefore not surprising that the AMF—which was endorsed by 
South Korea and several ASEAN countries—was averted by the objection of 
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the US government and the IMF.10)
The idea of an AMF—even though under a different name—was revived 
when the ASEAN fi nance ministers met with their counterparts of China, Japan, 
and Korea on the sidelines of the annual meetings of the Asian Development 
Bank on May 6, 2000, in Chiang Mai, Thailand, where they agreed to establish 
a system of bilateral short-term fi nancing facilities within the group. This agree-
ment, called the Chiang Mai Initiative (CMI), provides for mutual assistance 
consisting of swap arrangements in the event of a fi nancial crisis.11) The CMI 
consists of an expanded ASEAN Swap Arrangement (ASA) that includes the 
ASEAN countries and a network of Bilateral Swap Arrangements (BSAs) 
among ASEAN+3 countries. The ASA is now USD 2 billion in size, while 16 
BSAs have been successfully concluded among 8 countries with a combined 
total size of USD 83 billion. While the amounts available to potential borrowers 
under the CMI are small in relation to most East Asian countries’ foreign ex-
change holdings, the swaps nonetheless exceed borrowers’ quotas at the IMF by 
several multiples (Henning 2005). In May 2007, at the 10th ASEAN+3 Finance 
Ministers’ Meeting in Kyoto the ministers agreed to further develop the CMI 
and in particular seek to multilateralize it (ASEAN+3 2007). A year later, in 
May 2008 the fi nance ministers of the ASEAN+3 countries reaffi rmed on the 
sidelines of the annual meeting of the ADB in Madrid to multilateralize the 
CMI, i.e., to set up a pool of foreign exchange reserves (Volz 2008). They de-
cided that at least USD 80 billion of the region’s foreign reserves are to be fun-
neled into a regional fund to protect regional currencies against speculative at-
tacks and provide countries in crisis with liquidity. 20 percent of the funds are 
to be provided by the ASEAN members and the remaining 80 percent by the 
“Plus Three” countries.
Another important regional initiative in the fi eld of money and fi nance is the 
 10)  The role of the US in preventing the AMF will be discussed in detail in Section 4.2.2.
 11)  The wording of the declaration of the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers (2000) at Chiang Mai 
diplomatically depicts the region’s desire for reducing dependence on the IMF: “In order to 
strengthen our self-help and support mechanisms in East Asia through the ASEAN+3 frame-
work, we recognized a need to establish a regional fi nancing arrangement to supplement the 
existing international facilities. As a start, we agreed to strengthen the existing cooperative 
frameworks among our monetary authorities through the “Chiang Mai Initiative”.” On the CMI 
see Henning (2002) and Park and Wang (2005).
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ASEAN Surveillance Process, which the ASEAN fi nance ministers agreed on 
in Washington in October 1998. The objective of the ASEAN Surveillance Pro-
cess is to strengthen cooperation by (1) exchanging information and discussing 
the economic and fi nancial development of member states in the region; (2) 
providing an early warning system and a peer review process to enhance mac-
roeconomic stability and the fi nancial system in the region; (3) highlighting 
possible policy options and encouraging early unilateral or collective actions to 
prevent a crisis; and (4) monitoring and discussing global economic and fi nan-
cial developments which could have implications on the region and proposing 
possible regional and national level actions (ASEAN 1998). A similar scheme 
is ASEAN+3’s Economic Review and Policy Dialogue (ERPD), which has 
been in place since May 2000. Under the ERPD, fi nance ministers and deputies 
meet semi-annually to discuss economic and fi nancial developments in the re-
gion. In 2001, the ASEAN+3 fi nance ministers also agreed to exchange data on 
capital fl ows to facilitate an effective policy dialogue.
A third fi eld of cooperation directly resulting from the crisis experience is the 
development of regional security markets. For instance, ASEAN+3 countries 
have developed the Asian Bond Market Initiative (ABMI), which was origi-
nally proposed by Japan in 2002. The aim of the ABMI is to develop effi cient 
and liquid bond markets in Asia in order to enable a better utilization of Asian 
savings for Asian investments and to avoid the currency and maturity mis-
matches in fi nancing that exacerbated the fi nancial crisis. The ABMI includes 
efforts to modify existing regulations to facilitate the issuance of and invest-
ment in local currency denominated bonds, as well as the development of new 
securitized debt instruments, credit guarantee and investment mechanisms, 
foreign exchange transactions and settlement issues, and rating systems. In May 
2008, the “New ABMI Roadmap” was endorsed. The four key issues in the 
New ABMI Roadmap are (i) promoting issuance of local currency-denominat-
ed bonds (supply-side); (ii) facilitating the demand of local currency-denomi-
nated bonds (demand-side); (iii) improving the regulatory framework; and (iv) 
improving related infrastructure for bond markets and will be addressed by 
separate task forces (cf. Schou-Zibell 2008).
Complementary activities are the launch of the Asian Bond Funds (ABF) I 
and II by the Executives’ Meeting of East-Asia and Pacifi c Central Banks 
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(EMEAP).12) ABF I and II are aimed at promoting greater regional fi nancial 
integration particularly in bond markets to help fi nancing private sector invest-
ment in the region. For ABF I, which was launched in 2003, EMEAP central 
banks pooled USD 1 billion of their foreign reserves to purchase a basket of 
USD-denominated bonds issued by East Asian sovereign and quasi-sovereign 
issuers. In 2005 ABF II was established to invest a total of USD 2 billion in East 
Asian bonds denominated in local currencies. ABF II consists of a Pan-Asia 
Bond Index Fund and eight single-market funds investing in eight EMEAP 
bond markets and is also open to private investors.
While the initial focus after the crisis was on fi nancial cooperation, there 
have been also intensive discussions about exchange rate cooperation. Although 
no actual steps have been taken in exchange rate coordination hitherto, the 
ASEAN+3 countries have established a research group to explore the possibil-
ity of a regional exchange rate arrangement for East Asia and, more recently, 
the possibility of creating regional monetary units (see ASEAN+3 Research 
Group 2004). Moreover, several ASEAN leaders have repeatedly mentioned 
the option of creating a common currency for ASEAN (see, e.g., Estrada 1999, 
Severino 1999, Yong 2004, Siazon 2005).13) At the sidelines of the ADB meet-
ing in Hyderabad in May 2006, the fi nance ministers of Korea, Japan, and 
China pledged to enhance the existing cooperation framework to defend re-
gional currencies against speculators and announced that they will “immedi-
ately launch discussions on the road map for the system to coordinate foreign 
exchange policy” (Giridharadas 2006).
The most recent initiative in monetary and exchange rate cooperation was 
started by the ADB, which proposed the launch of an Asian Currency Unit 
(ACU) (see Kawai 2009). The ACU is envisaged as a virtual basket currency 
similar to the ECU that the Western European countries created in 1979 as part 
of the EMS. While it is not clear whether the ACU could become a forerunner 
of a common East Asian currency—indeed it still is unclear if and when it will 
 12)  EMEAP includes Australia, China, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New 
Zealand, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand. On the ABFs see Ma and Remolona (2009).
 13)  In the Hanoi Plan of Action of December 1998, the ASEAN heads of state and government 
agreed to “Study the feasibility of establishing an ASEAN currency and exchange rate system” 
(ASEAN 1998b, Section 1.4.1).
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be launched—it is undeniable that the region has developed a dynamic in re-
gional integration that cannot be ignored.
As Padoa-Schioppa (2005, p. 31) notes, “these initiatives are more than just 
a fi rst step towards greater cooperation, they have also created important fora 
for an ongoing policy dialogue at the level of fi nance ministers and central bank 
governors.” And indeed, they would have been unthinkable without the changes 
in East Asian policymakers’ attitudes toward regional cooperation brought 
about by the Asian crisis.
4.2 Stakeholders, interests, and policies
4.2.1 National actors
State actors
The actor most directly concerned with monetary policy in Japan is obvi-
ously the BOJ. The strengthening of BOJ independence trough the BOJ law 
reform has rendered the BOJ in a much more powerful position. From an insti-
tutional perspective, the BOJ will have all incentive to defend its recently 
gained independence. Therefore, the incentive to join regional monetary and 
exchange rate cooperation which would constrain its policy autonomy will be 
limited.
As outlined in Section 3, the primary duty of the BOJ is to maintain price 
stability and safeguard a smooth functioning of domestic fi nancial markets. The 
bank’s focus is therefore on internal developments, especially infl ation. Given 
the BOJ’s mandate, together with the fact that Japan is a large and still fairly 
closed economy where the degree of exchange rate pass-through to Japanese 
imports and the domestic price level is limited (Otani, Shiratsuka and Shirota 
2003, Fujii 2004), the exchange rate becomes a concern to the BOJ only to the 
extent that it infl uences the domestic price level.14)
Moreover, the experience with the Plaza and Louvre accords, where the 
world’s leading economies “agreed” on an adjustment of exchange rates, with 
the Japanese yen appreciating rapidly after the 1985 Plaza communiqué, left a 
bitter taste for exchange rate cooperation among Japanese policymakers and 
 14)  Cf. the BOJ (1999) statement quoted in Section 3.
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central bankers in particular.15) The massive yen appreciation is commonly re-
garded in Japan as setting the stage for the bubble economy, which after its 
burst threw Japan into what is frequently referred to as the lost decade. The 
conclusion that is often drawn from this episode is that the BOJ should focus 
exclusively on domestic monetary policy and ignore the external value of the 
yen as long as it does not hurt the Japanese economy.16)
However, while regional monetary and exchange rate cooperation has not 
been a prime concern for the BOJ, it has been involved in regional monetary 
cooperation—albeit on a low scale—since 1991, when EMEAP was incepted. 
Initially, EMEAP only held executive-level meetings twice a year to informally 
discuss economic and fi nancial developments in the region, but since 1996 
EMEAP holds also annual governor’s meetings. The same year EMEAP estab-
lished two working groups (one on fi nancial market development and one on 
central banking operations) and one study group on banking supervision. 
Within the fi nancial market development working group the BOJ was actively 
involved in the creation of the ABF-initiative and contributed USD 100 million 
to ABF I and USD 200 million to ABF II (BOJ 2003 and 2004).
In November 2005 the BOJ’s International Department established the Cen-
ter for Monetary Cooperation in Asia (CeMCoA), which is “aimed at promoting 
monetary cooperation in Asia and taking stock of information and know-how 
accumulated at central banks in Asia” (BOJ 2005). The BOJ describes CeM-
CoA’s main responsibilities as advancing monetary cooperation in the region; 
conducting joint research on Asia within and/or together with researchers out-
side the central banking community; and strengthening technical cooperation 
and training of central bank staff from neighboring countries. The creation of 
CeMCoA can be interpreted as the BOJ’s reaction to an ever increasing impor-
tance of the regional economy to Japan and an attempt to step up its own visibil-
ity in the regional arena.
The BOJ is also involved in the ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers Meetings, 
which have been held sine 1997, but the lead here is on the side of the MOF, 
with the BOJ consulting and supporting the ministry. Among all government 
 15)  On the politics behind the Plaza and Louvre accords and the pressure on Japan to appreciate 
the yen see Funabashi (1988).
 16)  Again, cf. the BOJ (1999) statement in Section 3.
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bodies, the MOF clearly has been the most active in initiating or taking part in 
regional monetary and fi nancial cooperation initiatives. For instance, the AMF 
proposal during the East Asian fi nancial crisis was developed and launched by 
the MOF. According to Eisuke Sakakibara (2000), then MOF Vice Minister for 
International Affairs, the MOF started to seriously work on the AMF proposal 
following a Tokyo conference on August 11, 1997, at which a group of neigh-
boring countries met under Japanese leadership to provide support to crisis-hit 
Thailand. The meeting, according to Sakakibara, created a sense of “unity of 
Asian countries” and led Sakakibara and Haruhiko Kuroda, then Director of the 
International Bureau of the MOF (and later MOF Vice Minister for Interna-
tional Affairs), to fl esh out the AMF plan, an idea they had both been consider-
ing since the Mexican peso crisis (Blustein 2001).17) Frustrated with the US and 
IMF response (or lack thereof) to the crisis, Japan was willing to provide half of 
the suggested USD 100 billion endowment for the AMF.
After the AMF plan failed (the reasons of which will be discussed in Section 
4.2.2), the MOF in October 1998 unveiled the “New Miyazawa Initiative”, a 
USD 30 billion aid package for the fi ve most affected East Asian crisis econo-
mies (Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, South Korea and Thailand), named 
after then Japanese Finance Minister Kiichi Miyazawa.18) In total, Tokyo com-
mitted more than USD 80 billion under the New Miyazawa Initiative. Under 
Miyazawa’s leadership, the MOF also endorsed the CMI. It is noteworthy that 
the funds Japan has pledged under the CMI stem from the MOF’s “Foreign 
Exchange Fund Special Account”, which consists of foreign currency and yen 
funds which are also used for intervention in the foreign exchange market by 
the BOJ as the agent of the MOF (BOJ 2000).19) The BOJ is involved in the CMI 
only in an operational way, i.e., it provides technical advice to the MOF on pay-
 17)  For a narrative of the background of the Japanese AMF proposal see Lipscy (2003) and Blus-
tein (2001). Lipscy highlights that the MOF had a strong interest in providing liquidity to Thai-
land (and later the other crisis economies) because Japanese banks’ exposure to Thailand was 
very high at the time, amounting to USD 38 billion, which was equivalent to about 25 percent 
of their total lending to developing countries. According to BIS data, 80 percent of short-term 
loans to Thailand came from Japanese banks.
 18)  See Castellano (2000).
 19)  More than 95 percent of Japan’s foreign exchange reserves are held by the MOF, with the 
BOJ giving assistance in the management of these holdings. The remaining 5 percent of Japa-
nese reserves are held by the BOJ.
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ment modalities or legal issues.
The MOF has shown a keen interest in promoting the development of re-
gional capital markets. Within the ASEAN+3 Finance Minister’s grouping it 
has nurtured the idea of developing regional bond markets, which contributed 
to the creation of the aforementioned ABMI. The MOF has assigned the Japan 
Bank for International Cooperation (JBIC), Japan’s governmental fi nancial aid 
institution, to work toward the goals of the ABMI.20) In particular, the MOF 
enhanced JBIC’s guarantee operation rights, so that it can not only issue local 
currency bonds in East Asia itself, but also guarantee those of Japanese fi rms 
within the region. The MOF’s interest in developing regional bond markets is 
threefold. First of all, the idea behind the ABMI is to contribute to regional fi -
nancial stability by mitigating the problem of currency mismatches that arises 
if fi rms fi nance in foreign currency, a problem that signifi cantly contributed to 
the crisis as the forced devaluations of East Asian countries during the crisis 
made it increasingly diffi cult for companies that had borrowed in dollar to pay 
back their debt. Second, more developed regional bond markets will help meet 
the local currency fi nancing needs of Japanese companies undertaking FDI in 
the region, thus improving their competitiveness. And third, regional bond mar-
kets will provide new opportunities for Japanese fi nancial investors. Against the 
backdrop of a rapidly ageing society, overseas investments in regional capital 
markets can provide an important insurance mechanism, i.e., help fi nancing 
retirement fund schemes for an ever increasing number of Japanese pension-
ers.
Other important state actors in the arena of regional economic cooperation 
include the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the Ministry of Economy, 
Trade and Industry (METI), neither of which are directly concerned with mon-
etary or exchange rate policy. MOFA and METI (as is the Ministry of Agricul-
ture), however, are directly involved in the negotiation of regional economic 
cooperation/free trade agreements. As monetary cooperation is only one aspect 
of economic cooperation, one should expect for repercussions from one area of 
integration to others. METI is generally known to be much in favor of regional 
 20)  JBIC was established in 1999 under the JBIC law out of a merger of the Export-Import Bank 
of Japan and the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund.
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trade integration (and sees its proposals for FTA agreements frequently com-
promized by the Ministry of Agriculture, which tries to protect Japanese farm-
ing interests). Recently, then Japan’s Economy, Trade and Industry Minister 
Toshihiro Nikai made an offer at the World Economic Forum in Tokyo in June 
2006 of setting up a FTA in East Asia comprising ASEAN+3 plus India, Austra-
lia and New Zealand, now known as ASEAN+6. He also suggested a new re-
gional policy coordination body modeled on the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD), with ASEAN as a motor (World Eco-
nomic Forum 2006).21) While METI has no offi cial position on exchange rate 
policy, its generally favorable attitude toward regional economic integration 
converts also to this area, without making METI a driving force of monetary 
integration itself.
Although it is hard to fi nd any evocative statement from the MOFA regarding 
regional economic, let alone monetary and exchange rate cooperation, MOFA 
is understood to take a strategic approach to international economic policy to 
secure a meaningful position for Japan in any regional initiative. A major con-
cern seems to be the fear of Chinese domination within the region and the 
worry to be pre-empted by China. The situation presents itself as a strategic 
game with China, where both countries are afraid that the other will assume the 
leadership role in the region. The fi nal part of this section will come back to 
this.
The private sector
As discussed in the theoretical section, one would expect internationally-
oriented businesses to be in favor of monetary cooperation, whereas domesti-
cally oriented corporations will prefer a policy that is tailored to domestic de-
velopments. Given that Japanese corporations have been heavily involved in 
regional markets—not only as importers and exporters, but also as investors 
(e.g., Tachiki 2005)—one would expect them to be vocal in support of regional 
exchange rate cooperation. Indeed, European businesses that were involved in 
 21)  The idea led to an agreement among ASEAN+6 of establishing the Economic Research Insti-
tute of ASEAN and East Asia (ERIA) at the third East Asian Summit in November 2007. ERIA’s 
secretariat has been established in Jakarta.
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regional operations were very supportive of moves toward European monetary 
integration (e.g., Collignon and Schwarzer 2003). Tables 2 and 3 show that Ja-
pan’s most important trading partners today are to be found within the region: 
about 40 percent of Japanese trade is conducted within the region. Moreover, 
Table 4 shows that Japanese FDI in the region has reached signifi cant amounts. 
Surprisingly, however, Japanese businesses appear to be rather mute on issues 
of regional monetary and exchange rate cooperation.
Nippon Keidanren (Japan Business Federation), the all-powerful and infl uen-
tial lobby group of Japanese business, has occasionally issued statements urg-
ing the Japanese government to foster regional economic cooperation. Most of 
them, however, were concerned with trade issues rather than monetary or ex-
change rate matters. There have been only a few statements of Keidanren that 
have addressed monetary and exchange rate matters. For instance, in a state-
ment in 2001, Keidanren (2001) highlighted that “[t]he Asian currency and fi -
nancial crisis in 1997 demonstrated eloquently that currency stability is essen-
tial to the economic development of Asian countries. As a result, an increased 
attention is being paid to a shift away from excessive dependence on the USD 
toward exploration of a new currency stabilization system and the role the JPY 
should play therein.” Keidanren (2001) bemoans that the “use of the yen has not 
progressed relative to the speed of Japanese business becoming international” 
and therefore “Keidanren renews its recognition for the yen’s role in Asia and 
recommends its enhanced international use through public-private cooperative” 
by “[s]trengthening economic partnership and regional cooperation in Asia”. In 
the same statement Keidanren endorses the Japanese government for advocat-
ing a regional currency swap, the creation and use of a common Asian currency 
basket and further AMF initiatives. It maintains that “[f]or these efforts to bear 
fruit, the use of JPY in international transactions must be expanded. In addition, 
while EU and NAFTA strengthen their respective regional ties, Asian countries 
need to strengthen their economic partnership through expanded trade and in-
vestments and move forward their regional monetary cooperation toward cur-
rency stability within Asia. The JPY is expected to play its role in such coop-
eration as a major regional currency. As a result, it is desirable for the stability 
of the global economy to have a tri-polar currency system consisting of USD, 
JPY and euro.” (Keidanren 2001) This and similar statements (e.g., Keidanren 
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The Economic Review, Vol. 1
2000) suggest that regional monetary cooperation would need to center on the 
yen. Indeed, from a Japanese perspective, regional monetary cooperation or 
regional exchange rate stabilization for long seemed to be understood as a sys-
tem in which the yen would be the anchor currency to which the others peg their 
currencies—similar to Europe where the smaller economies grouped around 
the German mark.22) However, Keidanren’s calls for an internationalization of 
the yen have abated (the 2001 statement was the latest we could fi nd on this 
topic), probably a realization that the idea of a yen bloc simply does not appeal 
to and will not win the support of the neighboring countries. With no more hope 
for a yen bloc, the topic of regional monetary cooperation seems to have slipped 
the minds of Japanese business leaders.
So why is the Japanese business community mute in demanding exchange 
rate cooperation with its biggest export and investment markets in East Asia? At 
least three reasons seem plausible. First, Japan is still a relatively closed econ-
omy. Even though Japan is one of the world’s largest exporters, its export to 
GDP ratio was only 14.8 percent in 2006, markedly lower than that of Germany 
for instance, which stands at 38.1 percent. The picture is similar when taking 
fi gures for total trade (imports plus exports) as percent of GDP as in Table 5. 
With 28.7 percent, Japan’s degree of openness is way below that of all other 
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
China 86.34 228.17 157.63 65.78 92.75 108.65 118.13 141.13
Hong Kong 100.29 56.03 37.47 35.20 38.01 39.45 35.98 52.46
Indonesia 183.31 84.91 101.58 39.66 50.80 54.41 53.20 62.17
Malaysia 61.31 50.57 39.06 32.42 42.69 46.69 37.48 36.53
Philippines 30.52 22.62 21.18 17.55 21.68 22.60 28.28 29.16
Korea 36.94 89.08 81.07 55.68 69.76 59.57 52.09 46.82
Singapore 121.65 118.12 83.56 75.05 94.39 110.23 99.28 90.66
Thailand 167.95 61.45 50.32 41.37 50.82 66.12 59.85 70.58
Table 4 Japanese FDI stocks abroad (in hundred million USD)
Source: UNCTAD WID country profi le.
22)  The idea of a yen bloc gained prominence in the 1980s at the height of Japanese economic 
power. One of the most ardent supporters of a yen bloc is Kwan (2001).
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neighboring counties and also much lower than the openness of the EU, which 
is 62.9 percent (73.7 percent for the euro area). Japanese trade openness, how-
ever, has increased signifi cantly in the past couple of years, and is projected to 
increase further (METI 2007, p. 204). A shrinking home market will increas-
ingly force Japanese fi rms to look for new markets abroad (e.g., Euromoney 
2007). With increasing openness of the economy, and ever growing linkages 
with China and the rest of East Asia, Japanese business is likely to put more 
emphasis on exchange rate developments with other East Asian countries.
Second, the Japanese export sector is highly concentrated. Whereas the ex-
port sector in most European countries, as a comparison, to a large degree 
constitutes small and medium enterprises (SMEs), Japanese exports are mainly 
conducted by large multinationals. Indeed, over 30 percent of Japanese exports 
are exported by the ten largest exporting companies, which include well known 
household names such as Toyota, Honda, Canon, Sony and Panasonic (Tanaka 
2004). These corporations have formed extensive production networks in East 
Asia, but they are also producing in the US and in Europe. Moreover, these 
fi rms, which are partly larger in economic size than the least developed coun-
tries in Southeast Asia, all have their own fi nancial infrastructures, including 
banks, and fi nancial know-how to hedge exchange rate risk, making Japanese 
exchange rate policy a secondary matter of importance to them. In a sense they 
are too big and too globally oriented to seriously worry about Japanese ex-
change rate policy, although of course large exchange rate swings such as those 
triggered by the recent fi nancial crisis have signifi cant impacts on their opera-
tions.
Smaller Japanese fi rms typically use specialized trading fi rms (shosha) as 
intermediaries for their exports.23) These trading companies are specialized in 
importing and exporting and have substantial expertise in managing currency 
risk. Hence smaller export-oriented fi rms often do not interact directly with 
their counterparts, and, because the management of exchange rate risk is dele-
gated to trading companies, they will tend to worry less about it. While the 
trading companies certainly demand their share in the transactions they carry 
out, they also offer other valuable services like fi nancing and marketing to 
 23)  See Yoshino and Lifson (1986) and Wichmann (1997).
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Japanese fi rms, many of which are constrained in their international outreach 
due to language problems.
Third, Japanese businesses, like those in the rest of East Asia, have gotten 
used to the East Asian dollar standard, an informal exchange rate arrangement 
in which the dollar has assumed the role of anchor currency for a majority of 
East Asian countries. This system has been also referred to as Bretton Woods II 
(Dooley, Folkerts-Landau, and Garber 2004), invigorating the post-World War 
II arrangement of fi xed pegs to the dollar. While the system of dollar pegging 
was interrupted in most countries through the Asian crisis, basically all East 
Asian countries with the exception of Japan still stabilize their exchange rates 
with the dollar today. These dollar pegs have, at large, served the region pretty 
well. The common pegging or soft pegging to the same external anchor has re-
sulted in a high degree of intraregional exchange rate stability, which helped 
secure a rapid growth of intraregional trade and the development of an exten-
sive trade-FDI-network throughout East Asia—with Japanese fi rms being 
among the most active in the region.
For Japan, the East Asian dollar standard has effectively reduced the number 
of relevant foreign currencies to two: the US dollar and (on a much lower de-
gree of importance) the euro. In 2001, 52.4 percent of Japanese exports and 
70.7 percent of Japanese imports were invoiced in USD (Goldberg and Tille 
2005, p. 20). With the BOJ at times intervening in the foreign exchange market, 
trying to limit exchange rate volatility vis-à-vis the dollar, Japanese fi rms have 
come to live quite well with the present system, giving them few reason to ask 
for changes.
But as was the case with the Bretton Woods I system which became increas-
ingly fragile with a weakening dollar and a high US current account defi cit in 
the late 1960s, the success of the Bretton Woods II system is built around the 
strength and credibility of the dollar, both of which seem to decline by the day. 
Indeed, several East Asian countries have recently allowed for more fl exibility 
toward the dollar, letting their currencies appreciate vis-à-vis the dollar. It is 
therefore foreseeable that the East Asian dollar standard will come to an end. 
Like in Europe almost forty years ago, today’s real economic ties in East Asia 
are too tight as to allow for a non-cooperative approach or a move toward 
freely fl oating rates throughout the region. The region will therefore have to 
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fi nd a new arrangement, and Japan’s government will have to consider whether 
to stay outside a new regional monetary and exchange rate arrangement, or 
whether it wants to shape the agenda. When a reassessment of East Asian mon-
etary relations becomes due, the Japanese corporate sector will also have to 
express its preferences.
Turning to the fi nancial sector, fi nancial lobby groups, such as the Japanese 
Bankers Association (Zenginkyo), have been quiet in demanding the govern-
ment to engage in regional monetary and exchange rate cooperation, just like 
Japanese manufacturing sector. The reason here is straightforward: the burst of 
the bubble economy threw the Japanese fi nancial sector into an existence-
threatening crisis. Corporate defaults left banks saddled with huge debts and in 
need of government rescue packages. The banking crisis caused a massive con-
solidation, which brought the number of so-called “city banks” (dominant 
banks in Japan serving urban population) down from 13 to three. In addition to 
domestic troubles, the East Asian crisis hit Japanese banks’ activities in the re-
gion, further weakening their position and causing them to curtail their interna-
tional and regional exposure.
The Financial Times (2008) observed that “[w]hile US and European fi nan-
cial institutions have been busily scooping up acquisitions in Asia, Japanese 
banks are conspicuous by their absence. Japanese banks have made just half a 
dozen acquisitions in Asia in the past three years, according to Thomson Finan-
cial, spending slightly more than $1 billion on total overseas acquisitions in that 
period. That is a fraction of the $22.5 billion spent by their western peers in 
Asia. This is an odd trend for Japan to buck. After all, Japanese banks have 
operated in China—where they continue to have modest branch networks—
since the 19th century and Asia is on their doorstep.” Given this abstinence 
from the regional market, it is not surprising that regional cooperation was no 
big topic for Japanese bankers.24)
But things are bound to change: Japanese banks have consolidated their bal-
ance sheets, and, in the judgment of the Financial Times (2008), today “they 
have the wherewithal to spend, being well-capitalised and boasting far more 
deposits than loans.” Moreover, “sluggish lending growth and shrinking demo-
 24)  As mentioned earlier, Japanese banks were indeed heavily exposed in the region until the East 
Asian crisis—in contrast to US and European rivals who have taken opportunity post-crisis.
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graphics mean sticking to home base is not really an option in the long term.” 
(ibid.) Indeed, pressure is building on Japanese banks to take advantage of the 
investment opportunities abroad: “With a shrinking domestic market, expand-
ing their overseas businesses is one of the few paths to growth left” (Nakamoto 
2008). Like in the corporate sector, increasing exposure to the regional econo-
my will increase the fi nancial sector’s stake in regional cooperation.
4.2.2 International actors
While the domestic scenery is a key determinant in shaping a country’s inter-
national monetary policies, policy options and choices are also infl uenced or 
constrained by the actions and decisions of other countries.25) China, South 
Korea, and the ASEAN countries are obviously factors of infl uence for Japan’s 
choice regarding involvement in regional cooperation, as are the USA.
Washington
Japan, being a close political and military ally of the United States since 
World War II, has traditionally been compliant to the US government’s policy 
stance. As Pempel (2007, p. 1) puts it, “Japan’s postwar foreign policy behavior 
has continually refl ected an ongoing deference to America’s power position, 
and Japanese policymakers have consistently structured their nation’s foreign 
policies with at least one eye constantly attuned to Washington’s preferences 
and changing priorities.” With the US disapproving of regional integration in 
East Asia—especially if built around institutions or fora that explicitly exclude 
the US from participating—the Japanese government has persistently tried to 
keep a balance between its regional ambitions and US interests. To this end, 
Japan traditionally sought to ensure regional economic and fi nancial, rather 
than political, cooperation and promoted open regionalism that would also in-
clude the US and other non-East Asian countries such as Australia, Canada or 
New Zealand.26)
The US government, in turn, has always made sure that the Japanese admin-
istration was aware of its interests and, in case of confl ict, concede to the US 
25)  Hamada (1974, 1987) models international monetary cooperation as a strategic game.
 26)  Examples are the Pacifi c Basin Economic Council (PEBEC) and the Pacifi c Economic Coop-
eration Council (PECC). See Langdon (1997) for details.
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position. The US has frequently deployed Japan as its closest ally in East Asia 
to secure its regional interests. For instance, when former Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohammed proposed the creation of an East Asian Eco-
nomic Caucus, a multilateral grouping of exclusively East Asian countries, the 
US (and Australia) vehemently opposed to this. With US pressure, the Japanese 
quietly tried to dismiss the idea, while the Australians promoted a more inclu-
sive Asia-Pacifi c Economic Cooperation Forum (APEC) forum as an alterna-
tive, which was then established in 1989 (cf. Fukuyama 2005).27)
The Asian crisis caused a big stir in the US-Japanese relationship. Seeing its 
economic interests in the region in danger and the US not willing to support the 
East Asian crisis economies, Japan launched the AMF plan, without seeking US 
approval, or even informing the US in advance. According to Blustein (2001, 
pp. 165–6), MOF Vice Minister for International Affairs Sakakibara sent an 
unoffi cial outline of the AMF plan to South Korea, Malaysia, Hong Kong, Sin-
gapore, and Indonesia on September 10, 1997. Although not intended for 
American eyes, the Treasury quickly got hold of the plan. US offi cials, to whom 
sending the proposal to the Asians without involving Washington seemed a rude 
departure from the normal conduct of the US-Japanese alliance, were enraged. 
The Treasury responded immediately after obtaining information on the AMF 
plan and actively opposed it.28)
 27)  Besides the US, China, Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the ASEAN countries, APEC also includes 
Australia, Canada, Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Peru, and Russia.
 28)  In his memoirs Sakakibara (2000, p. 185) reports that then Deputy Secretary of the Treasury 
Larry Summers called him directly at his residence at midnight and angrily shouted “I thought 
you were my friend.” During an intense two-hour phone conversation, Summers allegedly criti-
cized the AMF plan for excluding the US and sidelining the IMF. Summer’s telephone call to 
Sakakibara was only the fi rst of several conversations in which senior US offi cials expressed 
indignation to their Japanese counterparts that the rules of American-Japanese engagement had 
been violated. On September 17, Secretary of the Treasury Robert Rubin and Fed Chairman 
Alan Greenspan sent a letter to their Asia counterparts, followed up with visits to East Asian 
capitals by Tim Geithner of the Treasury and Ted Truman, the Director of the Fed’s Division of 
International Finance, to lobby against the AMF plan. While Tokyo won support of several East 
Asian countries, including Malaysia, the Philippines, and Thailand, Chinese offi cials told Japa-
nese emissaries that China could take neither a positive nor negative position, which, in effect, 
was nothing but a Chinese veto (Blustein 2001). According to Lipscy (2003), there is indication 
that the US lobbied China to oppose the AMF plan by highlighting the threat of “Japanese he-
gemony”.
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The US Treasury’s main criticism focused on two points: moral hazard and 
duplication of institutions. The AMF would only create an incentive for East 
Asian countries to delay necessary structural adjustments and add little to the 
pre-existing system centered on the IMF (cf. Lipscy 2003). Interestingly, Mi-
chel Camdessus, the then managing director of the IMF, initially welcomed the 
AMF proposal (he only disliked that it should be called “Fund”), but later re-
tracted his endorsement in the light of objections of the US Treasury. With Eu-
ropean support Washington made considerable efforts to wreck the Japanese 
proposal, arguing that the AMF would be an agency of potential confl ict with 
the IMF, so that Japan, which was unwilling to risk an outright confrontation 
with the US, abandoned the plan. The Treasury also responded to the AMF 
proposal by providing for faster activation of IMF facilities, offering bilateral 
funds to crisis countries, and by initiating the IMF’s Supplemental Reserve 
Facility (cf. Henning 2002 and 2005).
Admitting defeat of the AMF plan, Eisuke Sakakibara is reported to have 
said: “We were taught a valuable lesson on the infl uence the United States 
wields in Asia” (Blustein 2001, p. 168). Henceforth, Japanese policymakers 
have been cautious not to risk a clash with the US again. When the CMI was 
discussed, for instance, the ASEAN+3 fi nance ministers made sure that the 
CMI was not perceived in Washington as a threat to the IMF. To soothe con-
cerns that the IMF’s role would be undermined through the CMI, the ASEAN+3 
fi nance ministers agreed to include an “IMF link”, which required that beyond 
the fi rst 10 percent of each bilateral swap arrangement, borrowers must agree to 
an IMF program and its conditionality.29)
Apparently, the non-confrontational strategy worked much better. While the 
US Treasury had been largely responsible for the rejection of the AMF pro-
posal in autumn 1997, it took a softer though noncommittal line in the spring of 
2000 (Henning 2002). Edwin Truman, Under Secretary for International Affairs 
who represented the Treasury at the ADB meeting where the CMI was negoti-
ated, stated that regional initiatives such as the CMI could well be constructive 
in principle and that greater cooperation among Asian countries was “perfectly 
 29)  In 2005 the non-linked portion of the swaps was quietly increased from 10 to 20 percent. Cf. 
Henning (2005).
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appropriate”. He nevertheless reserved fi nal judgment, cautioning that “[t]he 
devil is in the details. If they are supportive of prompt fi nancial and economic 
adjustment, then I think they are to be commended, but we don’t know yet what 
will happen” (cited after Henning 2002, p. 13).
The Treasury maintained a critical stance also when the ADB announced 
plans for launching an Asian Currency Unit (ACU) in spring 2006. The ACU 
was envisaged as a weighted index of currencies for ASEAN+3, and was mod-
eled upon the European Currency Unit (ECU), which later developed into the 
euro. Haruhiko Kuroda, an ardent supporter of East Asian monetary integration 
who in the meantime had become President of the ADB, had pledged to propose 
the creation of an ACU at the ADB meeting in Hyderabad in May 2006, but 
reportedly held back in light of opposition from the US, who together with Ja-
pan is the largest shareholder in the bank, each with a 12.85 percent stake.30) 
China was reportedly also at unease with the ADB’s plans, as it strongly dis-
liked the idea of including currencies such as the New Taiwan and Hong Kong 
dollars in the currency index (Rowley 2006). Moreover, the fact that the pro-
posal originated from the ADB, which across the region is widely regarded as 
the long arm of the Japanese MOF, automatically raised suspicion in the other 
East Asian capitals (not least Beijing) (Johnson and Wolf 2006). In the end, the 
ADB was forced to put the ACU on hold.31) The ASEAN+3 Finance Ministers, 
however, picked up the idea of an ACU and decided to further explore it in 
study groups.
In the light of ongoing discussions by East Asian countries—including Ja-
pan—to step up regional monetary cooperation efforts and its own diminishing 
 30)  Timothy Adams, then Treasury Under Secretary for International Affairs, actually denied that 
the US had expressed concern about an ACU, telling the International Herald Tribune at the 
ADB meeting: “We don’t oppose it. I have no concerns about this issue.” (Giridharadas 2006) 
People familiar with the situation, however, maintain that the US did exert pressure on the ADB, 
arguing that its role was in poverty reduction, not encouraging regional integration. Volker 
Ducklau, the ADB’s executive director for Germany and Britain, was quoted in the press as say-
ing: “From the Americans there was an outcry, seeing it [the ACU] as a danger to the dollar” 
(ibid.).
 31)  Japan’s Vice Finance Minister for International Affairs, Hiroshi Watanabe, concluded that the 
debate is likely to take “some time” before any agreement can be reached. He described “[t]he 
ACU [as] one good example of regional cooperation [but] it is very political and will require 
much closer discussion” (Rowley 2006).
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infl uence in the region (a result of the tarnished reputation with which the US 
government and the IMF came out of the East Asian crisis), the US appears to 
have accepted that a confrontative opposition to East Asian regionalism would 
only further decrease its policy weight in the region. In a much-noted speech at 
the World Economic Forum in Tokyo in June 2006, Timothy Adams, Under 
Secretary for International Affairs signaled that the US Treasury would no lon-
ger fi ght efforts to create an ACU, “turning the page on more than a decade of 
largely consistent opposition to Asian monetary integration” (Guha and Mallet 
2006). In his speech, Adams (2006) described regional economic integration as 
“an important factor contributing to […] regional dynamism” in East Asia and 
that “we therefore support regional cooperation that is consistent with multilat-
eral frameworks.”32) With respect to the ACU, Adams spoke of “some confusion 
about the U.S. position on this topic” and stated that “[w]e do not see the ACU 
as a competitor to the dollar”. He also remarked that the US is “open-minded” 
on “currency cooperation within the region” and that “[w]e view proposals for 
Asian currency cooperation with interest”. Adams underlined that “we support 
outward-oriented Asian regional economic integration” and that “we think it’s 
important that Asian regional fi nancial initiatives complement and strengthen 
the multilateral framework.”33) In a press meeting back in Washington, Adams 
told reporters the US government hopes to be “intimately involved” in any 
steps toward fostering deeper economic cooperation among East Asian coun-
tries and that regional integration is “a way to keep rapid economic growth in 
the region on track, and to bring about greater stability in the region” (Schroed-
er 2006). He even suggested that such integration could include a single Asian 
 32)  Directed at the CMI, Adams (2006) said that “we see room for further clarity […]. Too little 
is known by the markets or by borrowers about amounts available absent IMF adjustment pro-
grams, and the conditions, if any, CMI creditors would impose. More clarity on these issues 
would aid an assessment of the CMI’s compatibility with the international system.”
 33)  In his speech Adams said: “I also wish to emphasize our position that Asia, along with other 
regions contemplating integration initiatives, must not tear down intra-regional walls only to 
erect new ones that exclude the rest of the world. Closed regionalism would have negative im-
plications for the region, given the continued importance of the extra-regional economies—
particularly the United States—to trade and capital fl ows in the region. Open regionalism can—
and is clearly more likely to—benefi t regional and extra-regional actors alike.”
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currency, akin to the euro (ibid.).34)
While Adams presented his notes as a clarifi cation rather than a shift in US 
policy, US offi cials admitted that the US is perceived in East Asia as being hos-
tile to regional monetary and fi nancial integration in principle, and wants to 
change this image (Guha and Mallet 2006).35) Dieter (2006, p. 49) views this 
policy shift rather as “a belated acceptance of America’s inability to bloc the 
emergence of monetary regionalism in Asia than an expression of a new will-
ingness to constructively engage America in a new form of fi nancial gover-
nance in the region.”
In any case, the US government’s change from a negative to a more neutral 
attitude toward East Asian monetary integration will presumably make it easier 
for Japan to take part in such initiatives.36) Outright confrontation with the US 
is still no option for Japan, as the alliance with the US is too important. On the 
other side, the US will be able to exert more infl uence on regional integration if 
Japan is involved—the alternative would most likely be an East Asian grouping 
dominated by China, with even less US sway.
Regional actors
For long Japan has been the undisputed economic leader in East Asia, and as 
such did not feel the need to seriously engage in regional economic coopera-
tion. A sluggish economic performance since the burst of the bubble and the 
simultaneous rise of other economies in the region, most signifi cantly China, 
have increasingly undercut Japan’s economic leadership. China has rapidly 
developed into a regional economic hub, and is courting Southeast Asian coun-
 34)  In the same meeting Treasury spokesman Tony Fratto said the US is not against deeper eco-
nomic ties among Asian countries, including a single currency, and that the US Treasury is “not 
opposed, right now, to any particular aspect of greater integration […]. If done the right way, it 
would be very benefi cial to the region and the global economy” (Schroeder 2006).
 35)  Masahiro Kawai, then head of the ADB’s Offi ce of Regional Economic Integration (and for-
mer MOF offi cial) who developed the ACU idea with ADB President Kuroda told the Financial 
Times that he was “pleasantly surprised” by what he saw as a new US approach to East Asian 
monetary integration (Guha and Mallet 2006).
 36)  As the Financial Times put it: “The green light from the US is a big fi llip for Japan, which has 
been pushing the idea of an Asian currency unit […] in face of considerable regional scepticism. 
It comes at a time of growing diplomatic closeness between Washington and Tokyo.” (Guha and 
Mallet 2006)
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tries with economic partnership agreements. The emergence of China as a re-
gional and global power, both politically and economically, constitutes a formi-
dable challenge for Japan.
Like Japan, China doesn’t seem to have developed a coherent regional strat-
egy. Rather, they both appear to be involved in a strategic game. Both China and 
Japan regard Southeast Asia as their own backyard, with both being eager to 
maintain or increase their infl uence in the region. At times, the result appears to 
be a “competition for regional cooperation”. As an example, China’s agreement 
in November 2004 with ASEAN to create the world’s largest FTA by 2010, with 
more than 1.8 billion people (ASEAN and China 2004) prompted Japan to 
launch its own formal trade negotiations with ASEAN about a similar ASEAN-
Japan FTA.37) And while the Chinese government was fi rst wary of associating 
itself with the Japanese AMF-proposal in 1997, it was the Chinese foreign min-
ister who proposed regional fi nancial cooperation to the ASEAN+3 fi nance 
ministers two years later (Henning 2005). Indeed, the fear to be pre-empted by 
the other country seems to be a driving force for both China and Japan to en-
gage in regional cooperation.
ASEAN countries are well aware of the Sino-Japanese rivalry. With its early 
role played in regional trade liberalization, ASEAN is certainly to be regarded 
as a driving force in regional integration. This is not to say that ASEAN mem-
ber countries all have the same ambitions and vision for regional integration. 
Indeed, motivations appear quite different in part. And yet, what all ASEAN 
countries have in common is their relative economic insignifi cance if contrasted 
to the two main regional players China and Japan, or even Korea. The rise of 
China in particular has created a feeling across ASEAN capitals that regional 
economic integration is imperative to maintain competitiveness and remain at-
tractive destinations for foreign investment (Volz 2006).
Moreover, the Asian crisis created a feeling in the affected economies of “be-
ing alone together”. It also nurtured resentment against the US, whose slow 
 37)  See Wall Street Journal Europe (2004) and Jopson (2004). The two agreements have come 
into effect by the end of 2008. A trading arrangement has also been concluded also being nego-
tiated between ASEAN and Korea. These arrangements are envisaged as building blocks for the 
possible establishment of an East Asia Free Trade Area (EAFTA) involving all ASEAN+3 coun-
tries. On the race for FTAs in East Asia see Munataka (2006, chapter 7).
40—  —
The Economic Review, Vol. 1
crisis response was seen in stark contrast to the quick and generous support it 
had given Mexico a few years earlier. The Japanese support during the crisis, 
even though driven by the self interest to secure investments of Japanese fi rms 
and recover lending of Japanese banks, helped boost Japan’s standing across the 
region considerably. In a similar fashion, the Chinese decision during the crisis 
not to suspend its dollar peg contributed to restoring stability in the currency 
markets and won Beijing praise. Indeed, the progress in regional fi nancial and 
monetary cooperation, as slow as it might have been, would have been unthink-
able without the crisis.
And yet the dynamics of regional economic cooperation that has transpired 
so far cannot obscure that neither ASEAN nor ASEAN+3 has a clear vision or 
integration agenda.38) Moreover, the rivalry between China and Japan runs deep 
and will encumber economic, including monetary and exchange rate, coopera-
tion. Both countries remain, despite their regional and international economic 
exposure, essentially inward-looking. Monetary and exchange rate cooperation 
is certainly less important for them than for the smaller Southeast Asian econo-
mies. Still, if the strategic aspect of regional leadership is added to the storyline, 
it is not unconceivable that the integration process develops its own momen-
tum.
5. Summary and conclusions
Regional monetary and exchange rate cooperation is a topic that has been 
attracting growing interest in Japanese academic and policy circles. At present, 
however, the voices demanding regional monetary and exchange rate coopera-
tion are mostly limited to academic circles and pockets within government. 
Japanese industry and fi nance has been remarkably mute on this topic, despite 
the heavy involvement of Japanese fi rms in the regional trade-FDI network. 
The reasons are threefold: fi rst, Japan is still a relatively closed economy, de-
spite its role as one of the world’s largest exporters. Second, the Japanese export 
sector is highly concentrated, with exports mainly being conducted by large 
internationally oriented fi rms which all have their own fi nancial infrastructures, 
 38)  For instance, the Charter that ASEAN leaders signed at the 13th ASEAN Summit in Singa-
pore in November 2007 exposed the sharp divisions persisting among the signatories (e.g., Ar-
nold 2007).
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including banks, and fi nancial know-how to hedge exchange rate risk. They 
therefore do not have a strong incentive to lobby for regional exchange rate 
stabilization. Third, Japanese fi rms, as elsewhere in East Asia, have gotten used 
to the East Asian dollar standard.
The situation, however, is likely to change, suggesting more demand from 
the side of the business community for regional cooperation. International—
and especially regional—trade is expected to become more important for the 
Japanese economy, with a growing number of small and medium fi rms getting 
more exposed to international transactions. Moreover, there is increasing un-
ease within the region about the dollar’s role as anchor currency, especially af-
ter witnessing its declining reliability in the fi nancial crisis, suggesting a regime 
shift in the rest of East Asia rather soon. Given that the Japanese government 
appears to be involved in a strategic game with other East Asian countries, most 
notably China, Japan is likely to respond to changes in the regional fi nancial 
architecture to preempt Chinese dominance with the region. Finally, the US has 
recently changed its stance to East Asian monetary and fi nancial cooperation to 
a more neutral position, giving more room for the Japanese government to en-
gage in regional initiatives without threatening its special relationship with the 
US.
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